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Diagnostic Analysis for Mechanical Systems 
1  Introduction 
1.1  The Diagnosability Problem 
The complex electromechanical systems that compose modern-day machines are more 
efficient, cost-effective, reliable than those of only a few years ago. Many systems 
today are integrated in such a way that components have multiple functions and are 
managed by sophisticated computer control systems [Manelski 1998]. While the 
benefits of this evolution in system architecture are numerous, such as increased 
reliability and simpler, more efficient designs, there is a significant drawback we seek 
to address in this research project. Because of the many component interdependencies 
in today's integrated systems, causes of failure are often difficult to distinguish. Thus, 
because of this increased complexity, more errors are made in the diagnosis and repair 
of electromechanical systems. This is a problem in diagnosability, the system 
characteristic defined as a measure of the ease of isolating faults in the system. 
There are two approaches to alleviating problems with fault isolation. The first is to 
make improvements to the diagnostic process for systems already designed and in­
service. This approach includes developing maintenance and diagnostic procedures 
and processes and incorporating electronic diagnostics into system design. There has 
been much research and application in this area of diagnosis. An example lies in the 2 
design of the Air Supply and Control System (ASCS) for the Boeing 767-400ER 
aircraft. Extensive built-in tests (BIT) were incorporated into the design to allow for 
problems to be easily diagnosed [Boeing]. 
Less work has been focused on a second approach to the problem, improving inherent 
system diagnosability. This approach involves looking at the problem during the 
design stage and asking the questions: How can this system be improved to make it 
easier to diagnose? What are ways ofmeasuring this system's diagnosability during 
design? In this approach we assume that changes in the structure of the system will 
affect the efficiency of diagnosing the system's failures. In endeavoring to understand 
and develop methodologies for improving diagnosability in this sense, we must have a 
good understanding of the diagnostic process (see section 2). 
1.2  Motivation for Pursuing Diagnosability Improvement 
Maintaining electromechanical systems is costly in both time and money, and 
diagnosability problems increase these costs. This fact serves as the primary 
motivation for exploring diagnosability improvement in systems ranging from 
airplanes to automobiles to high-tech manufacturing equipment. 
The number of maintenance actions on an airplane system (see Figure 1) serves as an 
illustration of the reality of the diagnosability problem, and as compelling motivation 
for exploring practical solutions. Figure 1 shows that for the Air Supply and Control 
System on an airplane, an average of 8.5 maintenance actions were executed to correct 
each indicated failure condition. Maintenance actions in this particular study can 3 
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Figurel  Maintenance actions on an airplane system 
include replacing, repairing, or checking a component or deferring action until a later 
time. These statistics are significant because more maintenance actions increase time 
and labor, and thus costs, and can affect safety because problems on mechanical 
systems persist longer than necessary. 
Thus, the motivation for this research is that the problem of efficiency in fault 
isolation has been a significant issue in maintenance time and life-cycle costs. The 
ability to predict the diagnosability of a system early in its design stage would enable 
the building of systems with more efficient fault isolation, leading to reduced life-
cycle costs. 4 
1.3  Background Work in Diagnosability Analysis 
Before further developing the diagnosability model in this paper, we will present a 
review of some previous research in diagnosability. 
Pau [1981] explores the links between data analysis and failure diagnosis. He asserts 
his data analysis methods can achieve several objectives important to diagnosis, 
including the following: 
• 	 Elimination of most redundant observations or tests 
• 	 Selection of tests and observations giving the best possible 
discrimination between failure causes and determination of 
equipment condition ... 
• 	 Elimination of imprecise symptoms ... [Pau 1981] 
These characteristics are important in the development of this paper, including the 
distinction between observations and tests. 
Ruff [1995] introduced the idea of mapping a system's performance measurements to 
system parameters. Performance measurements would be indications from lights, 
gauges, etc. Parameters were usually the system components being measured, such as 
valves, controllers, or actuators. The complexity of the interdependencies between 
measurements and parameters was directly related to the diagnosability of the system. 
Ruff also completed some initial work on evaluating competing designs based on life 
cycle costs associated with diagnosability. 
Clark [1996] extended Ruff's work by establishing some valuable metrics based on 
performance measurement-parameter relationships. The most significant of these 
metrics, Weighted Distinguishability (WD),  represents the complexities of 5 
interdependencies between components and indications. The distinguishability metric 
will be extended in this research, but evaluated from a different perspective (see 
section 4.1). 
Simpson and Sheppard [1994] devote a considerable portion of their book System Test 
and Diagnosis to diagnosability evaluation. They present a highly mathematical and 
theoretical analysis of diagnosis and testing adapted mainly for electrical applications. 
In evaluating diagnosability, they develop large matrices of test results and test 
conclusions to analyze and measure ambiguity and the ability to isolate faults. 
Wong [1994] developed methods for minimizing both the time and cost of diagnosis 
early in the design stage. Wong developed a checking order index for each system 
component, which was calculated by dividing the probability of failure by the average 
time to check the component. A ranking order of components to be checked could then 
be established for each possible failure indication. Wong then developed an expected 
time to diagnose for a given indication. 
Kurki [1995] researched model-based fault diagnosis, exploring the use of structural 
and behavioral models in examining fault detection and fault localization processes. 
Murphy [1997] developed prediction methods for a system's Mean Time Between 
Unscheduled Removals (Unjustified) (MTBURun). The MTBURwzj metric is a 
significant component attribute in doing diagnosability analysis. This present research 
will broaden the methodology that Murphy began in predicting MTBURunj• 6 
Finally, Fitzpatrick [1999] worked on developing methods for predicting Mean Time 
Between Failures (MTBF) and Mean Time Between Maintenance Actions (MTBMA) in 
addition to MTBURunj. 
1.4  Research Goals 
The overlying goal of this research is developing a method for measuring system 
diagnosability, and thus allowing for the comparison of designs and the prediction of 
life-cycle costs of fault isolation. The methods should allow for designs with optimum 
diagnosability and minimized diagnostic costs. In the course of pursuing this goal, 
several original contributions will be made in this paper. The following is a brief 
outline of these contributions. 
First, in section 2, we will present a broader picture of diagnostic phases and failure 
types for developing a diagnosability model. Previous research in mechanical systems 
focused on fault isolation based on indication and observation, but not on diagnostic 
testing. So there is opportunity in this paper to expand the model, accounting for the 
entire diagnosis process from operational indications to testing procedures. Similarly, 
previous research developed models for diagnosability assuming only full failure. 
However, in reality failures are often not so clear cut. Failures may also occur partially 
or intermittently, significantly effecting diagnosability assessment. This research will 
present an analysis of these additional failure types. 
In section 3, we will outline using Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) as tools in the development of a diagnosability model. 7 
Finally, based on this new examination of failures and diagnosis, section 4 will present 
a new, more mathematically rigorous, method for computing diagnosability metrics, 
including a prediction of the mean time between unscheduled component removals 
(MTBUR and MTBURunj). These metrics are important indicators in judging a system's 
diagnosability. 
The scope of the research will involve analyzing systems and their components to the 
level of the LRU (line replaceable unit). We will not concern ourselves with the inner 
structure of each LRU and what specifically has failed at that level of detail. (The 
terms LRU and component will be used interchangeably in this paper.) 
In summary, we will build on previous diagnosability research and introduce new 
methods in establishing a diagnosability model and diagnosability metrics. This 
project will broaden the picture of diagnosability so it more accurately reflects the 
range of circumstances to which it is applied. Ultimately, the methods from this paper 
will lead to systems with greater ease of fault isolation, and thus a higher likelihood 
that the correct LRU will be replaced when a failure occurs. 8 
2  Understanding Failure and Diagnosis 
This research will investigate two major areas in building a broader diagnostic model. 
The first is taking into account the two phases of the diagnostic process, observation 
and testing. The second area is considering failure types. Both areas highlight some 
unique characteristics of mechanical systems in contrast to electrical systems. 
2.1  Diagnostic Phases 
2.1.1  Phase 1: Observation 
The first phase of diagnosis is observation. During this first phase of diagnosis, 
observable abnormalities in system function and performance are noted (i.e., the 
presence of a liquid from a leak). Usually observation leads to the conclusion that 
there is a problem, or some loss of system function, but does not allow for 
understanding the problem entirely. By observing symptoms, or operational 
indications (effects), of failures, we are led to conclusions about the nature of a 
system's failure and its causes. Based on observation we can infer a set of possibly 
failed candidate components responsible for the observed symptoms. All of the 
components that are possible causes to a given set of indications are known as an 
ambiguity group [Simpson 1994]. There is ambiguity because each component in the 
group causes an identical set of indications to occur when they fail (see also section 
3.2 on indication sets). 9 
2.1.2  Phase 2: Testing 
Our goal in diagnosing failures is narrowing down the possible candidates and 
choosing the most-likely-failed component for maintenance. Therefore, attempting to 
minimize an ambiguity group of candidates leads us to the testing phase of diagnosis. 
The purpose of the testing phase is to gain additional information about a problem by 
running specific tests on system components. Knowledge from observation is used to 
determine the appropriate tests to conduct (see section 4.2.2). Ideally, the testing phase 
allows for the complete elimination of ambiguity (the ambiguity group contains one 
component).  However, as will be explored in the development of a testability metric, 
time constraints limit this ideal from always being possible. 
2.1.3  Example 
Let's use the example of an automobile in illustrating the two diagnostic phases. For 
phase one, there are many observations one can make in forming conclusions about 
problems with a car. There may be oil leaking, the "check engine" light flashing, or 
perhaps an abnormal sound. These are all observations leading to the conclusion that 
the car engine is not behaving within normal parameters. In other words, there is 
evidence of some sort of failure based on observation. 
For the testing phase, a voltmeter may be used to check electrical connections, or a 
mechanic could attach a diagnostic computer to the car to determine the cause of the 
"check engine" light. However, at the end of the process, there may still remain 10 
multiple probable causes to the automobile's symptoms. A mechanic would then have 
to choose the component to replace from the remaining ambiguity group. 
2.1.4  Differences Between Mechanical and Electrical Systems 
The relationship between the phases of diagnosis and diagnosability in mechanical 
systems differs from other applications. Most of the prior research into the diagnosis 
and testing process has been in the area of electrical and computer applications. For 
example, in Simpson and Sheppard, evaluating diagnosis involves analyzing 
exhaustive sets of tests on the system [Simpson 1994]. In electrical applications, the 
observation phase provides less information; more of the diagnostic process is 
dependent on the testing phase. However, unlike mechanical and electromechanical 
systems where testing is complex, costly, and time-intensive, large amounts of testing 
are relatively simple, low cost, and quick in the electrical and computer realm. 
Because of the higher time and costs, testing time becomes a more critical constraint 
in mechanical systems (this constraint will factor into our development of a testability 
metric later in the paper, see section 4.2.1). Therefore, while the methods developed 
previously in test and diagnosis study are valuable for studying diagnosability in 
mechanical applications, we are attempting in this project to more carefully 
understand the observation and testing phases of diagnosis in mechanical systems. 
Most specifically, we are interested in how these phases factor into optimizing system 
diagnosability. 11 
2.2  Failure Types 
In developing a broader understanding of the diagnosis process and a more accurate 
diagnosability evaluation, we will need to take a closer look at the nature of failure 
and the different ways failures can occur. In general, the failure of a component or 
system can most simply be expressed as a shortfall between performance and 
standards [Bignell 1984]. In other words, a system is designed to perform an expected, 
measurable behavior. When the system unacceptably deviates from this behavior, it 
has failed to carry out its designed function. This deviation can take the form of either 
the absence of desired function or the appearance of unwanted side effects [Bignell 
1984]. 
Often failure is modeled in a binary fashion. Either a system or component is failed or 
not. This binary approach to failure modeling was used in prior diagnosability 
research, and functions well in electrical and computer applications. Again we 
encounter an area where there is significant difference in diagnosability modeling in 
mechanical and electrical systems. Electrical systems are made up of complex 
connections between relatively simple components that are generally either failed or 
not. Modeling their failure in more detail would be difficult and unnecessary. 
However, in mechanical systems, failure is often more complex than this binary 
simplification. Mechanical systems have fewer components than electrical systems, 
yet the functionality of individual components may be much more complicated. 
Failure can vary in severity, from mild to catastrophic; failure can vary in totality, 
from partial to complete; and, failure can vary in periodicity, from intermittent to 12 
continuous. Finally, each failure can stand on its own or be part of a multiple-failure 
situation. Thus, rather than one failure situation for a given failure mode, there is an 
entire spectrum of possibilities in varying severity, totality, periodicity, and 
multiplicity. 
For a mechanical or electromechanical system this broader understanding of failure is 
needed to have a more complete and accurate picture of the system's behavior. 
Additionally, because the type of failure affects the system's symptoms and testability, 
the diagnostic process is affected by the nature of a given failure as well. Therefore, it 
will be significant to account for failure types in modeling diagnosability. 
For modeling purposes, it would be difficult to take into account a full continuous 
spectrum of failure types in each of the four categories above (severity, totality, 
periodicity, and multiplicity). Thus we will create classifications of failures in each of 
the failure types. For this research, we will classify each failure mode into three 
different types based on the above descriptions: full, partial, and intermittent. The 
failures can be further classified as mild or severe. I  First we will define each type of 
failure, then describe how that type effects diagnosis. 
2.2.1  Full failure 
A full failure occurs when an LRU completely fails to perform the function for which 
is was designed. For example, when a valve is stuck in the closed position, it is 
1 In this paper we will not quantify these failure types (i.e., a broader range of totality from none to 
full); however, this would be a valuahle enhancement to failure analysis. 13 
considered a full failure because it is not capable of performing its function to allow a 
fluid to pass through (i.e., provide airflow). 
A full failure is generally more easily diagnosed than partial and intermittent ones. 
The symptoms are present at all times, both when the operator detects the failure, and 
when a mechanic checks for it. Additionally, a full failure is likely to be more severe 
in nature, with a greater deviation from the desired behavior, making it easier to 
pinpoint the likely cause. 
2.2.2  Partial failure 
When an LRU is still able to perform its desired function, but to a limited degree, it is 
partially failed. An example is a pneumatic valve which is designed to provide 1.00 
m
3/s of airflow, but is only able to supply 0.50 m
3/s because it cannot fully open. 
Thus, at times the valve may be able to supply the necessary amount of air. But, if the 
system requires more than 0.50 m
3/s, the valve can no longer perform its function. 
Similarly, a valve able to fully open, but not responding properly (i.e., not at the 
correct pressure schedule), would be considered partially failed. 
A partial failure creates ambiguity in system performance. The system may not 
demonstrate any or all of the effects of full failure. For example, the system response 
may be "sluggish," but not completely ineffective. Indications such as gauges and 
built in tests may not show a failure condition, as in the above example if the system 
requires less than 0.50 m
3/s. Thus, for partial failures, information from the first 
diagnostic phase defined in the last section (observation of system performance and 14 
indications) is not as helpful as for a full failure. The second phase of diagnosis 
(testing) becomes a more crucial step in isolating a fault. In the valve example, a 
mechanic would be able to observe the valve opening only partially or in the wrong 
conditions. 
2.2.3  Intermittent Failure 
When an LRU is in a failed state at some times, and completely functional at others, it 
is intermittently failing. The failure could be at random times, or only during certain 
system operating modes. An example is an airplane-system valve that fails to open 
during flight, but works properly on the ground. 
Intermittent failures can be difficult to test. A failed component can cause a system to 
perform improperly and display certain indications during operation, yet work 
perfectly fine when it is tested as a possible cause of the problem. This situation is 
similar to the plight of a patient who notices certain symptoms at home, but then the 
symptoms are not present when he or she goes into the doctor to be checked. 
Intermittent failure can easily misdirect the diagnostic process, because if an LRU is 
tested to be functioning properly, mechanics will assume it is not the cause of the fault 
and look at other candidates. Thus, for intermittent failures, information from the 
testing diagnostic phase is not as helpful as with full failure. Information for the 
observation phase needs to be gathered when the system is in a failed mode. 15 
2.2.4  Failure severity 
Eubanks [1997] describes varying failure severity in an icemaker. If the icemaker is 
slightly tilted from its proper angle, it will produce non-uniform ice cubes. If the 
icemaker is highly misaligned, the results are very small ice cubes mixed with large, 
partially liquid ice cubes. So the specific degree of tilt can lead to different failure 
modes (i.e., 5-10
0  misalignment or > 10
0 
). We will revisit the icemaker example later 
in the paper (section 3.3 and 4.4). 
Classifying failure severity can sometimes diminish ambiguity in fault diagnosis. 
"Ambiguity groups can be minimized if we take into consideration the magnitude of 
parameter changes, in addition to direction and sequence of changes." [Sen 1996] For 
example, continuing with the pneumatic value from above, a failure may create a state 
of low over-pressurization or very high over-pressurization. Quantifying how much 
extra flow is being allowed through the value acts as an additional indication to the 
failure state of the system. 
2.2.5  Multiple failures 
Multiple failures occur when two or more components are concurrently in a failed 
state. How often multiple failures occur is a function of the failure rates of the 
individual components; usually this is much more infrequent than single failures. 
Exceptions are in the case where components are highly interdependent and one 
failure may cause a cascading reaction of subsequent failures. In the analyses and 
models developed in this paper we will assume that only one component has failed 16 
when a failure indication occurs. However, we will make notes about how the 
processes may be modified to account for multiple failures. 17 
3  Building a Diagnosability Model 
The first step in evaluating a design for diagnosability is building a model, which 
shows the relationships between components of the system and possible failure 
indications. Sen, et al.  [1996] state: 
...  a common modeling paradigm is necessary to represent large 
systems consisting of electronic, electrical, mechanical and hydraulic 
subsystems ... a test engineer analyses the system, either bottom-up or 
top-down, identifying various failure source-test dependencies of the 
system. The resulting model forms the basis for system-level testability 
analysis and fault diagnosis. 
This section describes the system's Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and 
Fault Tree Analysis (FT  A), and how they are used to build the diagnosability model. 
This model will then be used to calculate the system's diagnosability metrics (see 
section 4). 
3.1  Extracting Information for the Model 
The main information sources for building the diagnosability model are the FMEA 
and the fault tree. These two documents contain different perspectives on the failure 
characteristics of a system, and together offer a complementary picture of a system's 
reliability and structure early in the design process. The FMEA is organized in a 
"bottom-up" approach [Leitch 1995], considering each of the system components and 
analyzing each possible failure mode for its effects at higher levels. The fault tree has 
the opposite perspective as a "top-down" analysis [Leitch 1995], and is organized by 18 
first considering possible failures and then analyzing all possible causes at lower 
structural levels. Taken together, the FMEA and fault tree can create a fairly accurate 
representation of the failure-structure relationships in a system needed for effective 
diagnosability analysis. 
2 
3.1.1  FMEA 
The FMEA is a widely used document for failure analysis, and will serve as our 
primary document for obtaining diagnosability information. From the FMEA 
designers can gain important insight into a system's structure and information flow 
early in the design process. The data and relationships in FMEA are also valuable 
input for predictive analysis such as criticality, operability, manufacturability, 
maintainability, and the diagnosability we are addressing here [Leitch 66]. We will 
describe the basic structure of the FMEA document, as well as the enhancements 
needed for the FMEA to contain all of the relevant and necessary information for 
diagnosability analysis. 
Again, as stated in section 1.4, the FMEA is organized by components (LRUs), which 
are the smallest level of structure we identify for diagnosability analysis. For each of 
the components in the sub-system, assembly, etc. being considered, the basic FMEA 
provides the following information: 
"Family genealogy. which can be analyzed both bottom-up and top-down in "tree" diagrams. is a good 
analogy to FMEA and the fault tree. A bottom-up family tree will identify parents, grandparents, and 
great-grandparents. while a top-down family tree will identify brothers and sisters, aunts and uncles, 
and cousins. Together, like the FMEA and FTA, the two family models present a complete 
understanding of all family relationships. 19 
• 	 The function of the components 
• 	 All of the most likely failure modes of the component 
• 	 The failure rates of each mode, or of each component combined with 

failure mode frequency. 

• 	 The failure effects on higher levels in the structure, from sub­
assemblies to the whole system. [Leitch 1995] 
For the FMEA to be most useful for diagnosability, some sections need to added to the 
standard form to produce an enhanced FMEA for diagnosability. As stated in earlier 
sections, we want to consider the broader spectrum of failure characteristics for a 
system including totality and periodicity, and information available during the 
diagnosis process including both observation and testing phases. 
Therefore, each failure mode can be broken down by failure type, including full, 
partial, and intermittent. Each failure type will have its own failure rate, i.e. Arull,  Apart' 
and Aint. Each failure mode-type combination will also need to have a description of its 
failure indications. Additionally, it may be helpful to have replacement time data for 
each component (see section 4.1.3, replacement matrix), and diagnostic testing 
information (section 4.2.2). 
The diagnosability model can be constructed from the FMEA by making connections 
between components, failure modes, and indications as described in the FMEA table. 
This process will be outlined in section 3.2 and 3.3. 
3.1.2  Fault Tree 
Fault Tree Analysis may also be useful for building our model. Fault trees are widely 
used not only in reliability analysis, but also in safety analysis because they are able to 20 
predict causes of failure beyond mechanical malfunction [Bahr 1997]. For example, 
they are able to take into account human error and other environmental influences. 
And while FMEA allows designers to focus on specific components and their failure 
characteristics, fault trees tend to allow for focusing on a particular failure and the sets 
of component interactions with can lead to that failure. Thus, there is a new 
understanding of structural relationship uncovered by looking at the fault tree 
perspective. Furthermore, and important to diagnosability analysis, the fault tree is a 
valuable tool in computing failure rates. With knowledge of component failure rates, 
the fault tree allows the rates to be multiplied or added up the tree to obtain a 
cumulative failure rate for each failure. 
The main disadvantage to the fault tree in building our diagnosability model is the 
binary nature of the events in the tree. Because we are interested in broadening our 
look at failure into a wider spectrum and more complete picture, we must be careful 
not to over-simplify based on the fault tree data [Harms-Ringdahl 1993]. Thus, it is 
best to use the fault tree as a supplementary data source to the FMEA. 
3.2  Diagnosability Model 
From the information in the FMEA we can analyze failure indications and establish 
unique indication sets. These indication sets are linked to system components to form 
our diagnosability model. 
An indication is a measured or observed deviation from the desired behavior or 
performance of a system. The complexity in the diagnosis process arises because a 21 
given indication, or set of indications, does not necessary point to one failed 
component. The relationship between indications and components is illustrated in 
Table 1. Here, the lower case "i" represents an individual indication. The upper case 
"I" represents the set of individual indications which all occur for a given failure. Note 
that if we were including multiple failures in our model, we would add entries for 
multiple component failures (i.e., C2C3) along with their corresponding indications. 
Component/ 
Failure Mode 
Indications 
( ) = sometimes 
Indication Set 
CI/FMl  i1  11 
CI/FM2  iI, i2  12 
C2/FMl  iI, i2  12 
C3/FMI  i2,(il)  13, (12) 
C3/FM2  il  11 
Table 1  Simple Indication Set Illustration 
In this simple case, when i 1 and i2 appear, there is ambiguity (thus forming an 
ambiguity group) because either component one or two has failed (or both have 
failed). Here, il and i2 form the unique indication set 12. The component-indication 
diagram this illustration is shown in Figure 2. Each line represents a unique failure 
mode. Attached to each mode is a particular failure rate A. Figure 2 represents the 
critical information needed for our diagnosability model. 22 
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Figure 2  Component-Indication Diagram 
Human error or time constraints could cause some indications to be missed. 
Additionally, certain maintenance procedures could affect diagnosis. For example, 
some airline procedures (or unofficial maintenance practices) allow for deferring a 
maintenance action or repeatedly replacing a part that is not likely failed but easily 
replaceable. Furthermore, human error is often the cause of misdiagnosis (drawing the 
wrong conclusions from correctly identified indications). These human factors and 
organizational factors will not be accounted for in our model, and in this paper we will 
assume that diagnosis is occurring with all indications accurately observed. However, 
metric values we calculate in the next section may be adjusted to account for these 
factors. 
3.3  Validation Example: Ice-Maker 
We will now use some of the modeling methods developed in this section to form a 
diagnosability model for a validation example. 23 
Eubanks, Kmenta, and Ishii outlined the method for using an Advanced FMEA 
(AFMEA) for modeling a system's behavior. They suggested that their AFMEA could 
be used for diagnostics prediction [Kmenta 1998]. In fact, Eubanks et al. highlight the 
inherent relationship between FMEA and diagnosis early in their work. While FMEA 
builds a model of what behaviors 
FMEA result from given structures, the 
diagnosis process attempts to 
accomplish the opposite: seeking 
Diagnosis
the system structure responsible for 
a given system behavior (or  Figure 3  FMEAJDiagnosis Relationship 
[Eubanks 1996] 
misbehavior) (Figure 3) [Eubanks 
1996]. 
Eubanks, et al.  [1996, 1997] use an icemaker to illustrate the AFMEA. In order to 
validate the suggested link between their AFMEA and diagnosis, we will extend the 
icemaker example by building its diagnosability model. Eubanks presents a function-
structure mapping of the icemaker, but for diagnosability analysis we will need to 
expand this model to include failure indication and component failure rates. 
Eubanks, et al. [1997] bring up an important diagnosability issue in the case of 
external factors. Often indications in a system are not caused by failure of one of the 
system's components, but rather due to some external influence. This cause could be 
an environmental factor (i.e., cold temperature) or from another sub-system 
interconnected with the one being analyzed. From a diagnosis perspective, this issue is 
STUCTURE 
(Failure) 
BEHAVIOR 
(Misbehavior) 24 
significant because the failure indication may lead to the replacement of a part that is 
not failed. 
The traditional FMEA only accounts for components of the system, not external 
factors. For the icemaker, Eubanks, et al.  [1997] use their behavior modeling to 
identify the refrigerator's alignment as an external factor affecting the icemaker. 
External factors may also be extracted from a fault tree analysis. We will incorporate 
the misalignment into our icemaker FMEA as an "external component." 
A complete icemaker FMEA is included a the end of this report. Table 2 summarizes 
possible failure indications. Notice that is and i7 are denoted "not observable." These 
indications are listed in a separate column of the FMEA, and will not be accounted for 
in forming indication sets. However, these indications would be helpful in analysis of 
the testing phase. 
i1  No ice the bucket 
i2  Ice overflowing 
i3  Low ice level in the bucket 
i4  Ice layer in bucket and/or fused ice cubes 
is  No water in the mold (not observable) 
i6  Small or irregular ice cubes 
i7  Ice stuck in the mold (not observable) 
i8  Icemaker not running 
i9  Feeler arm in the bucket 
ilO  Large or partially liquid ice cubes 
Table 2  Failure indications for the icemaker 25 
As we explained in section 2, there is a high degree of variation in failure modes, and 
therefore in component-indication relationships as well. The process of grouping 
indications into indication sets can be rather subjective, as was the case here. Table 3 
summarizes the likely component-indication relationships revealed in the FMEA.
3 
Component  Indication Sets  Component  Indication Sets 
Cl  1216  C6  1215 
C2  121314  C7  II 12 
C3  1213  C8  II 12 
C4  II 15  C9  1215 
C5  II 12  E (External)  1517 
Table 3  Component-Indication relationships for 

the icemaker 

In the next section we will discuss the computation of diagnosability metrics. The 
icemaker example will then be continued in section 4.4 where we compute its 
diagnosability metrics. 
3 Small variations of this model can easily be incorporated into the metric computations of section 4 to 
experiment with effects of changes in the model. 26 
4  Diagnosability Metrics 
We have developed a set of metrics that comprise a complete description of the 
diagnosability of a system and its components. To derive these metrics, we translate 
our component-indication model into a matrix model. These matrices can be more 
easily manipulated mathematically to produce numerical results. First, we will analyze 
our system based on information only from the observation phase.  The result will be 
our new distinguishability metric.  Secondly, we will extend the analysis to the testing 
phase, and our distinguishability metric will be broadened into the testability metric. 
Finally, we will evaluate the MTBUR of the system and its components, completing a 
set of metrics, along with the replacement rate matrix, which give valuable insight into 
the diagnosability of the system. 
4.1  Distinguishability 
The metric associated with the observation phase of diagnosis we define as 
distinguishability (D), an estimate of the probability a mechanic, in the initial 
maintenance attempt, will correctly infer a specific component as the cause of failure, 
given some failure indication has occurred.
4 The metric comes in several forms: 
system, indication, and component distinguishability (Dsys,  Dilld,  DLRU).  Additionally, 
4Note that this is a different definition of distinguishability from Clark [1996]. While it remains a 
similar system measure, this new D is specifically a probability of removal rather than an arbitrary 
index value. 27 
Dind and DLRU can be unweighted or weighted (WDind,  WDLRU). The D metrics are all 
conditional probabilities of a justified removal. 
5 Table 4 summarizes the individual 
definitions. 
Metric  Probability of: 
Dsys  justified removal, given some failure indication (or some component failed) 
n  m 
computed as:  :IWDind (i) or :IWDLRU (j) 
i=1  j=1 
Dillli)  justified removal, given ith failure indication 
WDinli)  ith failure indication and justified removal, given some failure indication 
DLRu(j)  justified removal, givenjth component failed 
WDLRU(j)  jth component failed and justified removal, given some component failed 
Table 4  Definitions for Distinguishability metrics 
Clark [1996] established a method for evaluating system distinguishability, which is 
important for comparing the overall diagnosability of competing designs. However, in 
order to evaluate the design of a system, it is helpful to have a metric that evaluates the 
distinguishability of each individual component in a given configuration. DLRU fits this 
criteria by measuring the overall ability to separate a given component from others in 
the process of isolating faults. If the number of components mapped to a particular 
indication decreases, then DLRU will decrease as well. While Diml and DLRU are very 
similar, the former helps in understanding ease of diagnosis and the latter is geared 
toward optimizing design. 
5 Removing a failed component is justifIed. Removing a working component is unjustified. 28 
4.1.1  Susceptibility 
Another metric family related to D is susceptibility (5), which are the probabilities of 
unjustified removals, and summarized in Table 5: 
Metric  Probability of: 
Ssys  unjustified removal, given some component removed 
m 
computed as: 1-DSYS or I,WSLRU (j) 
j=! 
SLRU (j)  unjustified removal, givenjth component removed 
WSLRU (j)  jth component removed and unjustified removal, given some component removed 
Table 5  Definitions for Susceptibility metrics 
The main different between Sand D is that D is conditional on a particular failure 
occurring, while S in conditional on a particular replacement occurring. Also note that 
Ssys is not unique information from Dsys , but only the inverse probability. As we will 
see later on, S is closely related to MTBURunj. 
4.1.2  Example problem: Distinguishability Analysis 
To illustrate the method for obtaining these metrics, we will use an simple, abstract 
sample problem (not representing an actual system). From the FMEA (Table 6), we 
obtain the component-indication relationships for the system. The component-
indication relationships from the FMEA are diagramed in Figure 4. 29 
Component  Modes (Indication Sets) 
Cl  I1  13 15  ' 
C2  13 15 
C3  I1  1416 
C4  12 
C5  I1  121415 
Table 6  Abbreviated FMEA for 
example problem 
Figure 4  Component-Indication Diagram for 
example problem 
As discussed in the last section, each failure mode (and correlated indication set) has a 
specific failure rate (Ii,).  Failure rates are the expected frequency of failure over a long 
period of time. Over short periods, the frequency of failure will vary. These failure 
rates can be organized as shown in Table 7 for the example problem. 30 
[10·  C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  Indication  Indication 
failures/hour]  Rate  Prob 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Comp Rate 
Comp Prob 
2  0  4  0  3 
0  0  0  2  15 
3  2  0  0  0 
0  0  17  0  25 
10  12  0  0  3 
0  0  8  0  0 
15  14  29  2  46 
0.142  0.132  0.274  0.019  0.434 
9  0.085 
17  0.160 
5  0.047 
42  0.396 
25  0.236 
8  0.075 
1061 
Table 7  Component-indication failure rate table for example 

problem 

Each row can be summed to obtain an indication rate,  ~nii). Each column can be 
summed to obtain a component's failure rate (for all failure modes), ALRU(j). The sum 
of these rates is the system failure rate,  Asys. The indication probability or component 
failure probability is computed by dividing the indication rate or component failure 
rate by the system failure rate.
6 
4.1.3  The Failure Rate Matrix Aand Replacement Matrix R 
For obtaining our metrics, we will convert the failure rate data into an n x m matrix, ')... 
(There are n indication sets and m components). Additionally, we will form a n x m 
replacement matrix, R. The replacement matrix is an important mathematical 
representation of the predicted maintenance action for each indication. Each row of R 
contains a single 1 and the rest zeroes. The one is placed in the column representing 
6 Initially, for computing distinguishability and testability, it is fine to use relative failure rates; 
however, when we calculate MTBUR we will need absolute failure rates. 31 
the component that will be replaced for the corresponding indication. The replacement 
component can be determined using one of three criteria: 
•  Failure rate 
•  Replacement time 
•  Checking index (Failure rate / replacement time) 
For this example, we will use the highest failure rate to determine the replacement 
component in each row of R. So for indication one, the"  1" is placed in the third 
column because C3 has the highest failure rate. It is important to note that in this 
analysis we are considering only the initial maintenance attempt. We will deal with 
accounting for subsequent removals in the section on the MTBUR metric (section 4.3). 
Thus we have: 
2  0  4  0  3 
0  0  0  2  15 
3  2  0  0  0
A=  0  0  17  0  25 
10  12  0  0  3 
0  0  8  0  0 
R= 

0  0  1  0  0 
0  0  0  0  1 
0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0 
0  1  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0 
4.1.4  Computing the Replacement Rate Matrix AR 
From the Aand R matrices we obtain the m x m (square) replacement rate matrix, AR, 
by multiplying the transpose of the replacement matrix by the failure rate matrix 
(Equation 1). Equivalently, the element in the ith row andjth column of AR is obtained 
by taking the dot product of the ith column vector of R with the jth column vector of A 
(Equation la). 32 
Cl 
C2 
Replaced 
Component C3 
C4 
C5 
Failed Component 
Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5 
0  0 
0 
2 
0  0 
0  0  17 
UNJUSTIFIED 
REMOVALS 
Figure 5  Replacement Rate Matrix AR 
The AR matrix shown in Figure 5 includes each combination of component failures 
and replacements. The numbers in the diagonal of the AR matrix are the rates for 
justified removals. The numbers in the off-diagonals are thus unjustified removal 
rates. From these rates we can easily obtain all our metric values. For example, the 
failure rate for Cl is 15 x 10.
4 failures/hour. The justified removal rate is 3 x 10-
4
. 
Thus, DLRU is computed as 3/15 =0.200. Table 8 summarizes the metric values for this 
example problem: 33 
lIe No.  Dind  WDind  DLRU  WDLRU  S  WS 
1  0.444  0.038  0.200  0.028  0.400  0.019 
2  0.882  0.142  0.857  0.113  0.520  0.123 
3  0.600  0.028  0.414  0.113  0.294  0.047 
4  0.595  0.236  0.000  0.000  N/A  0.000 
5  0.480  0.113  0.870  0.377  0.322  0.179 
6  1.000  0.075 
Dsvs =  0.63  Dsvs =  0.63  Ssvs =  0.37 
Table 8  Metric Values for example problem 
Dsys and Ssys are a system-wide metrics, helpful in determining the system-wide effect 
of changes in diagnosability. In the current model, our system has a 63% probability 
of being diagnosed correctly after the observation phase of diagnosis. Table 8 also 
illuminates the differences between weighted and unweighted metrics. The 
unweighted metrics range from 0 to 1 for each value, whereas the sum of the weighted 
metrics ranges from 0 to 1. The weighted metrics give sense of the importance of the 
indication or component metric in the perspective of the whole system. For example, 
indication three has a satisfactory Dind value of 0.600; however, its WDind value of 
0.028 suggests the indication's metric is not as significant as others. 
There are a couple of components that Table 8 highlight as good candidates for 
diagnosability improvement.  We notice that component one has a low 
distinguishability of 0.200; however, this is less significant because its weighting is 
relatively low. Component three is important to consider: it has only a 41 % chance of 
being diagnosed correctly on the initial attempt, coupled with its significant WDLRU 
value of 0113. 34 
4.2  Testability 
The second metric we will develop, associated with the testing phase of the diagnosis 
process, is testability (T). Simpson and Sheppard [1994] introduce the following 
definition for testability: 
...  a design characteristic which allows the status (operable, inoperable, 
or degraded) of an item to be determined and the isolation of faults 
within the item to be performed in a timely and efficient manner. 
Our testability metric is a measure of the design characteristic to which Simpson and 
Sheppard refer. Similar to distinguishability, testability will measure the probability a 
correct component is isolated after diagnostic testing has occurred. Thus, testability 
broadens the scope of our diagnosability measurements to the testing phase. As it turns 
out, distinguishability (D) is a special case of testability CT) where no testing has taken 
place.  Additionally, by examining the changes between T and D  (LJT) , we can 
ascertain, for the system or an individual indication or component, the ability for 
ambiguity to be decreased (or discernment increased) through testing procedures. 
4.2.1  Critical Time 
Crucial to the testing phase of diagnosis is the critical time  Tc' for testing. In 
mechanical systems, testing can be time intensive task. There is a critical point for 
which the costs of additional testing outweigh the gains in ambiguity reduction. This 
critical time is apparent in airplane maintenance, where after a certain amount a time a 
flight will be delayed or even cancelled. We will model a testing phase that is 
constrained by the critical time. When there is more time available for testing, more 35 
tests can be run and thus more 
ambiguity eliminated. The 
testability value will therefore be a 
function of Te (Figure 6), where 
higher Te values should produce 
higher Tvalues. (In reality, the 
1.0  ..........,. ........; 
I  :::.:; ........
 ............... -t.......................... ....:;;;;... ---­
T(t) 
D 
I 
testing time 
function in Figure 6 would have  Figure 6  Typical Testability Function 

steps, representing added tests, 

rather than a smooth curve.) 

The values of the T family parallel those of D and are summarized in Table 9: 
Metric  Probability of: 
Tsys(rc)  justified removal, given some failure indication and critical time T e 
n  m 
computed as: LWI:nd (i) or LWTLRU (j) 
i=l  j=l 
Tinii, Te)  justified removal, given ith failure indication and critical time T e 
WTinii,  Te )  ith failure indication and justified removal, given some failure indication and 
critical time Te 
TLRu(j,  Te)  justified removal, givenjth component failed and critical time Te 
WTLRu(j,  Te)  jth component failed and justified removal, given some component failed and 
critical time Te 
Table 9  Definitions for Testability metrics 
It should be noted that the S metrics will also change values, and continue to provide 
important insight, when testing is taken into account. 36 
4.2.2  Example Problem Continued: Testability Analysis 
We will expand the theoretical example problem begun in the distinguishability 
section to illustrate testability analysis. The computation of T will be similar to D, but 
we will need to analyze the testing options and make some adjustments to the failure 
rate and replacement matrices. 
The first step in computing testability is to catalog the available system tests. Each 
indication set has an associated catalog of possible tests that verify the candidate 
components for that indication. Each possible test has an associated testing time (see 
Table 10 below). The test symbols (Tij )  shown in the table have additional subscripts 
that denote the candidates they verify. If a test is negative, then neither component is 
failed. If a test is positive, then either or both of the components are failed. (However, 
we will continue to make the simplifying assumption that only one component has 
failed.) Our catalog of test needs take into account failure types of the candidate 
components for each indication. As mentioned in section 2.2.3, intermittent failures 
may not be verifiable by testing. 
Table 10 lists tests relevant to indication one, sorted by the checking index. The 
checking index is computed by dividing the failure probability by the testing time. The 
failure probability used for computing the checking index is obtained in one of two 
ways. For tests that verify one component (i.e., Tl verifies CI), that component's 
failure probability, given indication one, is used. Because there are only three 
candidates for indication one, tests that verify either of two candidate components 37 
actually verify the remaining candidate (i.e., T35 verifies Cl). Thus, the probability 
for the remaining component is used for the checking index computation.? 
Test  Failure Rate (A.) 
[10-
3/hour] 
Test time (t) 
[min] 
Checking Index 
(A.lt) 
T1  2 (verifies C1)  3  0.67 
T3  4 (C3)  7  0.57 
T23  4 (C3)  10  0.40 
T5  3 (C5)  13  0.23 
T35  2 (C1)  9  0.22 
T45  3 (C5)  14  0.21 
T12  2 (C1)  15  0.13 
Table 10  Example Test Set and Checking 

Order for Indication One 

The checking order gives the ideal progression of tests for the testing phase of 
diagnosis. A high checking index means that test should be run first. 
8 The testability 
metric will be a function of which tests can ideally be run which verify the maximum 
number of components within the critical time restriction. 
If we wanted to expand the model further, we could include component removals in 
the catalog of tests as well. Removals have the same effect as tests. For example, C 1 
may be removed for testing, or because of misdiagnosis, and found normal. C 1 is then 
verified and the fault lies elsewhere. Thus Table 10 could include removals R 1, R3, 
7 These multiple index tests (i.e., T35) are more difficult to compule into the checking index when there 
are more than three candidate components. Thus, while these tests are included here to show the 
possibility of these tests, it may be easier to conduct this analysis with only "single-index" tests. 
S For more information on optimum test sequencing in localizing failure, see Pau Chapter 4. 38 
and R5 with their respective replacement times (which typically are longer than testing 
times). 
4.2.3  Matrix Row-Split Method 
To compute the values of T, we will return to the matrix methods developed in section 
4.1.3. Because testing introduces multiple replacement possibilities for a given 
indication, we will have to make some modifications to the failure rate matrix Aand 
replacement matrix R. To illustrate these modifications, we will continue with the 
testing analysis of indication one in the example problem. 
Ifwe have a critical time of eight minutes, there is only time to run one test, T].9 There 
are two possible outcomes. If the test is positive, then C 1 is failed and C 1 will be 
replaced. We will denote this scenario as test outcome Tl.1. If the test is negative, 
then either C3 or C5 are failed. In this case, if failure rate is the replacement criteria, 
then C3 would be replaced (test outcome TI.2). The first row (corresponding to 
indication one) of the matrices would be split into two rows for each outcome. 
9 Actually, a mechanic may in this case decide to run only T3, as this test can be run within the critical 
time and verifies a component with a higher failure rate. 39 
Matrix Row Split for Indication One111  ~ T1.1rr1.21 
[2  0 
Failure Rate Matrix A 
4  0  3] ~  [2  0  0  0  ;] o  0  4  0 
Replacement Matrix R 
[0  0  1  0  0]  ~  [1  0  0  0 
o  0  10  ~] 
Figure 7  Matrix Row Split for Indication One 
Notice that each new row of R contains a single"1" indicating the component 
replaced as before. The following is sample computation of the replacement rate 
matrix AR from revised matrices for all indications, where each row has been split into 
test outcomes. 
o T Tl.l  2  0  0  0 
Tl.2  0  0  4  0  3 
T2.1  0  0  0  0  15 
T2.2  0  0  0  2  0 
T3.1  3  0  0  0  0 
T3.2  0  2  0  0  0 
T4.l  0  0  17  0  25 
T5.1  0  12  0  0  0 
T5.2  0  0  0  0  3 
T5.3  10  0  0  0  0 
T6.1  0  0  8  0  0 
• 

1  0  0  0  0 
0  0  1  0  0 
0  0  0  0  1 
0  0  0  1  0 
1  0  0  0  0 
0  1  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  1 
0  1  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  1 
1  0  0  0  0 
0  0  1  0  0 
= 
AR 
15  0  0  0  0 
0  14  0  0  0 
0  0  12  0  3 
0  0  0  2  0 
0  0  17  0  43 
There are now many more values on the diagonal of AR, and therefore more justified 
removals. In effect, each test outcome moves a value vertically in its column from an 
off-diagonal to a diagonal position in AR (compare the new matrix with the one 40 
illustrated in Figure 4).  Table 11  shows how the testability changes for various critical 
time values for indication one. 
Critical Time 
[min] 
Testability of 
Indication One 
,1Tind 
0  0.444 (Din d)  0 
8  0.667  0.222 
12  1.00  0.556 
Table 11  Effect of critical time on 

testability values 

As stated earlier in section 4.2, it is helpful to examine the change between 
distinguishability and testability. Table 12 shows the how testability analysis effects 
the diagnosability metrics. (Again, for this example problem, we have increased 
critical time from zero to eight minutes between computing D and T). By this table, we 
can tell that the testing phase has significant impact on indications three and five, 
along with components one and four. Notice the greatest susceptibility decrease is for 
component two. 
lie No.  ,1 Tind  ,1WT ind  ,1T LRU  ,1WT LRU  ,15  ,1WS 
1  +0.222  +0.019  +0.800  +0.113  -0.400  -0.019 
2  +0.118  +0.019  +0.143  +0.019  -0.520  -0.123 
3  +0.400  +0.019  0.000  0.000  -0.094  -0.019 
4  0.000  0.000  +1.000  +0.019  N/A  0.000 
5  +0.520  +0.123  +0.065  +0.028  -0.039  -0.019 
6  0.000  0.000 
LlTsys =  +0.18  L1TSYS =  +0.18  LlSsys =  -0.18 
Table 12  Metric value changes with the testing phase 41 
Component one, which we flagged has having low distinguishablity in section 4.1.4, 
had a +0.800 improvement after testing (giving CIa testability of 1.0). However, C3 
had poor diagnosability after the observation stage, and Table 12 indicates there was 
no improvement in its TLRU. This result would strengthen C3 as candidate for 
diagnosability improvement. 
4.3  Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removals 
While the D and T metrics are valuable for design evaluation, we would also like a 
metric that lends itself more to the evaluation of the life-cycle costs associated with 
fault isolation. For this purpose we use Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removals 
(MTBUR). (For example, The Boeing Company has developed a cost model that uses 
MTBUR as one of its inputs [Boeing].) This metric, rather than measuring a 
probability of a removal like D or T, measures the average time between removals. 
Because MTBUR accounts for all component replacements, we need to rework the 
failure rate and replacement matrices, which previously only accounted for the initial 
replacement. We will again utilize the matrix row-split method to make this 
adjustment. Figure 8 illustrates the changes to the matrices made for indication one, 
for both distinguishability and testability computations (we denote the rows "IM" and 
"TM" to correlate with MTBUR): 42 
Observation Phase: 11  -7  IM1.1I1.2/1.3 
(11  split into three rows) 
Failure Rate Matrix A  Replacement Matrix R 
[2  0  4  0  3] -7  r~  ~  ~  ~  ~3]
o  0  0  0 
[0  0 
Test Phase: T1.1I1.2 -7 TM1.1.1I1.2.1/1.2.2 
(Test outcome 1.2 split into two rows) 
~  ~l 
o  3  [1 0 0 0  0]  -7 [1
o  0  1  0  0  0 
o  ~  ~  ~  ~ll 
o  1  0 
Figure 8  MTBUR Matrix Row Split for Indication One 
Simply put, these new matrices describe the replacements made for each failure 
scenario, based on using the failure rate criteria. Each row of A now contains only one 
element (for one failure mode). The corresponding row of R describes all the 
component replacements predicted for the failure (each row can now have multiple 
"1 "s). Figure 8 shows that for indication one, C l's failure leads to replacements of C 1, 
C3, and C5 (based on our criteria, the order of replacement would be C3, CS, Cl). In 
the second row, C3's failure leads to the initial, justified replacement ofC3. Finally, 
the third row represents CS's failure leading to the replacement of C3 and CS. 
MTBUR can be calculated directly from the revised AR matrix. If each row is summed, 
we obtain a removal rate for each component (RLRu), 43 
MTBUR=_l­
RLRU 
MTBUR may be broken up into justified and unjustified removals. While MTBURjllst is 
related to component reliability, MTBURunj is more closely related to fault isolation 
problems. For calculating these metrics, we separate RLRU into a justified part (the 
diagonal matrix element) and an unjustified part (the sum of the off-diagonals for that 
row). Note the relationship between the MTBUR metrics: 
-l 
MTBUR=  1  +  1 (MTBURjust  MTBURunj J 
Table 13 summarizes the MTBUR results for our example problem. In the table, N/A 
denotes that the LR U is never replaced according to the model (can be considered 
MTBUR ---+ (0). In the columns for change, a "+" indicates a change from some value 
to N/A. 
Observation  TestinQ  ChanQe 
LRU  No.  MTBURunj  MTBUR MTBURunj  MTBUR MTBURunj  MTBUR 
C1 
C2 
C3 
C4 
C5 
5,000 
769 
2,000 
N/A 
323 
588 
370 
294 
5,000 
130 
N/A 
N/A 
3,333 
N/A 
588 
667 
714 
313 
5,000 
159 
+ 
+ 
+1,333 
N/A 
+265 
+79 
+344 
+19 
0 
+29 
System  196  64  500  79  +304  +15 
Table 13  MTBUR Values for the example problem 44 
These MTBUR values suggest the impact each individual LRU will have on 
maintenance costs of fault isolation. Generally, the data shows that MTBUR values 
have improved due to testing. We would conclude, from its low MTBUR value, that 
C5 is a likely LRU for focusing on fault isolation cost improvement. 
4.4 	 Validation Example Continued: Ice-Maker Diagnosability 
Metrics 
Now that we have established the method for computing diagnosability metrics, we 
will use the information from the icemaker FMEA in section 3.3 to calculate the 
metrics for the icemaker. The metrics values for the icemaker are listed in appendix, 
along with the entire spreadsheet tool used to calculate the replacement rate matrix and 
metric values. For this validation we only took the analysis through the observation 
phase level. The validation could be expanded further by cataloging tests and using the 
methods of section 4.2. 
For the icemaker, the switch linkage and switch (C2 and C3) have interesting 
diagnosability characteristics. The switch linkage has a 1.00 distinguishability, 
weighed at a significant 0.311 over the whole system, suggesting satisfactory 
component diagnosability. However, the linkage does have the lowest MTBUR of 
21,008 hours. In contrast, the switch itself has a DLRU of 0.0 an overall 0.119 
misdiagnosis probability, 10 the highest of all components. 
10 The misdiagnosis prohability was not formally given a name as a metric, hut can still be 
informative-as is  the case hcrc. 45 
The difference in C2 and C3 highlights the fact these components have high failure 
rates combined with the same indication profile. So for the best diagnosability, we 
want to configure systems so the components with lowest reliability have different 
failure indications. These numbers also show us that components with good 
distinguishability numbers may still have a low MTBUR value because of their low 
reliability. Thus, it is beneficial to evaluate all the metrics before drawing conclusions. 
The AR matrix also shows us that external factors (E) contribute to the water delivery 
system's (C6) having the highest susceptibility (S) for the icemaker. This fact serves to 
validate Eubank's assertion that external factors are an important consideration in our 
modeling. 46 
5  Summary and Conclusions 
Our objective in this research was to create a method for modeling a system in way 
that readily describes the system's diagnosability characteristics, or the ease of 
isolating faults in the system. After presenting the problem of diagnosability and the 
motivations for pursuing improvement, we established the setting for developing our 
model by describing failure and diagnosis. The full spectrum of failure types and 
complete diagnostic process provided a framework for a more accurate model for 
diagnosability analysis. We described the use of the FMEA and fault tree for 
extracting the information needed for our model. Finally, we presented a new process 
for computing diagnosability metrics by using matrix algebra and the matrix "row­
split" method to derive the highly informative replacement rate matrix AR. Important 
in this process was the new replacement matrix R, which described the predicted 
maintenance actions for given indications. From AR we were able to extract many 
dIagnosability measurements, including the distinguishability, testability, and MTBUR 
metrics. We successfully validated many of our methodologies with the icemaker 
mechanism presented by Eubanks [1997]. The new mathematics for computing the 
metrics are relatively simple compared to previous methods. Changes in the model can 
be input into a spreadsheet tool, instantly computing updated diagnosability measures. 
The methodologies of this paper are generally applicable to many electromechanical 
systems. However, diagnosability analysis is most beneficial to systems with low 47 
reliability, high maintenance costs, and high complexity. I I The results reveal 
important characteristics of the system, failure indications, and individual components 
for improving diagnosis times and minimizing the costs of fault isolation. Observing 
changes in the metrics disclose the diagnosability effects of design changes. 
There is opportunity for future work in several areas. More could be uncovered in the 
complexity of failures and their relationship to the diagnostic process presented in 
section 2; these failure and diagnosis theories can be more tightly woven into the 
modeling and metric computation process, creating a more accurate representation of 
system diagnosability. For example, failure modes could be weighted in the metric 
computation by the failure's severity. Failure severity-or the consequences of 
failure-could also affect the replacement and testing criteria (checking index). 
Furthermore, the adjustments made in section 4.3 to account for all replacements, 
creating a modified AR matrix, could possibly be extended to create more accurate 
distinguishability and testability metrics. Finally, the methods of this research can be 
validated more rigorously on a complex system beginning early in its design process. 
II While the icemaker example served as a simple case for validation in this paper, these criteria suggest 
it would not benefit as greatly from diagnosability analysis as other systems. 48 
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Appendix Icemaker FMEA Document 
Component  Function  Failure Mode  Failure Type  Failure Rate 
[per million 
cycles] 
Effect  Sys Effect 
(observable) 
Indication Code 
( )  =sometimes 
[Indication Set] 
1 Feeler arm  Sense ice level in 
bucket 
Broken off  Full  3  No ice, feeler arm in 
bucket at times 
I, (9)  [2], (6) 
2  Switch linkage  Feeler arm - Switch 
connection 
Stuck closed  Full  60  Ice overflow  2  [3] 
Stuck closed  Intermittent  50  Ice overflow  (2)  [3] 
Stuck open  Full  80  No ice  I  [2] 
Stuck open  Intermittent  70  Low ice in bucket at 
times 
(3)  [4] 
3.  Switch  Acti vateldeacti vate 
ice maker 
Stuck closed  Full  50  Ice overflow  2  [2] 
Stuck open  Full  50  No ice  I  [3] 
4.  Mold  Hold water, form ice 
geometry and size 
Crack  Partial  8  Water leak  Small ice, ice layer 
in bucket 
6, (4)  [5] 
Hole  Full  I  Water leak, mold 
empty 
No ice, ice layer in 
bucket 
1,4  [I] 
5.  Freezer  Freeze water  Not functioning  Full  30  High temp  No ice, water in 
bucket at times 
1,  (4)  [2], (I) 
6.  Water Delivery 
System 
Fill mold wI water  Not functioning  Full  25  No water in mold  No ice  1  [2] 
Slow water  Partial  45  Small ice  6, (3)  [5] 
7.  Mold heating 
system 
Loosen ice  No  heat  Full  90  Ice stuck in mold  No ice  I, (4)  [2], (1) 
8.  Ice harvesting 
system 
Remove icc from 
mold 
Not functioning  Full  30  Ice stuck in mold  No ice  I, (4)  [2],(1) 
9.  Ice timer  Allow proper 
freezing time 
Not functioning  Full  40  Ice stuck in mold  No ice  1  [2) 
Too fast  Partial  15  Water leak  Small ice  6, (4)  [5) 
EXTERNAL: 
Refrigerator 
Alignment 
Create a consistent 
water level in the ice 
mold 
Small 
misalignment 
Mild severity  150  Small ice  6  [7) 
Large 
misalignment 
Severe  40  Water leak  Small ice, ice layer 
in bucket 
6,4 
[5] Component-Indication Failure Rate Matrix for example problem 
Indication  Indication 
[10-4 hOU(1]  C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  Rate  Prob 

11 
 2  0  4  0  3  9  0.085 
17  0.160  Worksheet for calculating  12  0  0  0  2  15 
3  2  0  0  0  5  0.047 13  metrics for example problem 
14  0  0  17  0  25  42  0.396 
15  10  12  0  0  3  25  0.236 
8  0.075 
Comp Rate  15  14  29  2  46 
16  0  0  8  0  0 
1061 
Comp Prob  0.142  0.132  0.274  0.019  0.434 
Replacement Matrix 
C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  Justified  P(Just) WP(Just)  replacement probabilities 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
0  0  1  0  0 
0  0  0  0  1 
1  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  1 
0  1  0  0  0 
0  0  1  0  0 
4  0.444  0.038  given indication 
15  0.882  0.142 
3  0.600  0.028 
25  0.595  0.236  /
12  0.480  0.113 
8  1.000  0.075 
67  0.63 
Replacement Rate Matrix 
Failed Rate 
Repl Rate  Justified  P(Just)  WP(Just)  Unjust  P(Unj)  WP(Unj) Replaced  C1  C2  C3  C4  C5 
2  0.400  0.019 3  2  0  0  0  5  3  0.600  0.028 C1 
12  0.480  0.113  13  0.520  0.123 C2  10  12  0  0  3  25 
5  0.294  0.047 2  0  12  0  3  17  12  0.706  0.113 C3 
0  #DIV/Ol  0.000  0  #DIV/Ol  0.000 C4  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  17  2  40  40  0.678  0.377  19  0.322  0.179 59 C5 
67  0.63  39  0.37 15  14  29  2  46  106 Comp Rate 
67 3  12  12  0  40 Justified 
0.200  0.857  0.414  0.000  0.870 P(Just) 
0.028  0.113  0.113  0.000  0.377  0.63 WP(Just)  \  given component replaced 
12  2  17  2  6  39 Unjustified  ~  0.800  0.143  0.586  1.000  0.130 P(Unjust)  given component failed 
0.113  0.019  0.160  0.019  0.057  0.37 WP(Unjust) ---
Testability Failure Rate Matrix 
Indication 
.... [1:....:o=--.4:....:h.:..::Oc::U-:::r"1,fl-:+__ .::C-=1__ --"-C:;:-2___C:::.3=-_---.,;C:::.4:=---_---=C=,S  Rate 
T1.1  2  0  0  0  0 
T1.2  0  0  4  0  3  9  - ----------~-.------------ --~---~.-----
T2.1  0  0  0  0  15 
T2.2  0  0  0  2  0  17
T3.1---- 3~ O---~~O-----0----0 
T3.2  0  2  0  0  0  5 
-- ------ -----------~ -- -------------­
T4.1  0  0  17  0  25  42 
TS.1  --0----~---f2--- O----O--O--·~-
H~  0  0  0  0  3 
TS.3  10  0  0  0  0  25
T6.11----0 ---0
-·~8- -~O----Of------8 
Comp Rate  15  14  29  2  46  106 
Comp Prob  0.142  0.132  0.274  0.019  00434 
C1  C2  C3  C4  CS  Justified 
Worksheet for calculating 
testability metrics for 
example problem 
P{Just) WP(Just) 
T1.1  1  0  0  0  0 
T1.2  _~Q..  _  _.Q..  ~_  _  !___  O  ___  ......Q ___.._6_.Jl.~_.2.057 
T2.1  0  0  0  0  1 
T2.2 ~__  _ Q.~  ~_....Q ____ () __-.-!_  ~----.9 ___ ~1Z.....~0~_0.160 
T3.1  1  0  0  0  0 
T3.2 __.Q.. _____ 1___.2. __ .2___~0__  5  1.000  0.047 
T4.1 ___ Jl..._~_O_____ 0___.J2._____ ~--- 25  0.595  0.236 
TS.1  0  1  0  0  0 
TS.2  0  0  0  0  1 
TS.3  0  0  0  0  25  1.000  0.236 
----.~-----.--- -~-------=t------:::------:--=-----
T6.1  0  0  0  0  8  1.000  0.075 
86  0.81 
Rate  Failed 
Replaced  C1  C2  C3  C4  CS  Repl Rate  Justified  P(Just) WP(Just)  Unjust  P(Unj)  WP(Unj) 
C1  1S  0  0  0  0  15  15  1.000  0.142  0  0.000  0.000 
C2  0  14  0  0  0  14  14  1.000  0.132  0  0.000  0.000 
C3  0  0  12  0  3  15  12  0.800  0.113  3  0.200  0.028 
C4  0  0  0  2  0  2  2  1.000  0.019  0  0.000  0.000 
CS  0  0  17  0  43  60  43  0.717  00406  17  0.283  0.160 
Comp Rate  15  14  29  2  46  106  86  0.81  20  0.19 
Justified  15  14  12  2  43  86 
P(Just)  1.000  1.000  00414  1.000  0.935 
WP(Just)  0.142  0.132  0.113  0.019  00406  0.81 
Unjustified  0  0  17  0  3  20 
P(Unjust)  0.000  0.000  0.586  0.000  0.065 
WP(Unjust)  0.000  0.000  0.160  0.000  0.028  0.19 Failure Rate Matrix 
Indication  Indication 
1.00E-07  Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  E  Rate  Prob 
11  0  0  0  1  10  0  70  20  0  0  101  0.121 
12  1  80  50  0  20  25  20  10  40  0  246  0.294 
13 
14 
15 
0 
0 
0 
110 
70 
0 
50 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
45 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
15 
0 
0 
40 
160 
70 
108 
0.191 
0.084 
0.129 
Worksheet for calculating 
icemaker metrics 
16  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  0.002 
17  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  150  150  0.179 
Comp Rate  3  260  100  9  30  70  90  30  55  190  8371  1.000 
Comp Prob  0.004  0.311  0.119  0.011  0.036  0.084  0.108  0.036  0.066  0.227  1.000 
Replacement Matrix  Dind  WDind 
Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  CS  C7  C8  C9  E  Justified  P(Just)  WP(Just) 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
a 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
0 
0 
a 
0 
0 
0 
a 
a 
a 
0 
0 
a 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
a 
1 
a 
a 
1 
a 
0 
0 
0 
0 
a 
0 
0 
0 
a 
a 
a 
a 
0 
0 
a 
a 
a 
0 
0 
a 
0 
0 
a 
a 
a 
1 
70 
80 
110 
70 
45 
2 
150 
0.693 
0.325 
0.688 
1.000 
0.417 
1.000 
1.000 
0.084 
0.096 
0.131 
0.084 
0.054 
0.002 
0.179 
527  0.S3 
Replacement Rate Matrix 
Rate  Failed  SLRU  WSLRU 
Replaced  Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  CS  C7  C8  C9  E  Repl Rate  Justified  P(Just)  WP(Just)  Unjust  P(Unj)  WP(Unj) 
Cl  2  0  0  0  0  0  a  0  0  0  2  2  1.000  0.002  0  0.000  0.000 
C2  1  260  100  0  20  25  20  10  40  0  476  260  0.546  0.311  216  0.454  0.258 
C3  a  0  0  0  0  0  0  a  a  0  0  0  #DIV/O!  0.000  a  #DIV/O!  0.000 
C4  a  0  a  0  0  a  0  a  a  a  a  0  #DIV/O!  0.000  a  #DIV/O!  0.000 
C5  a  0  a  0  0  a  0  a  a  a  a  0  #DIV/O!  0.000  a  #DIV/O!  0.000 
CS  a  a  a  8  0  45  0  a  15  40  108  45  0.417  0.054  63  0.583  0.075 
C7  0  0  0  1  10  0  70  20  0  0  101  70  0.693  0.084  31  0.307  0.037 
C8  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  #DIV/O!  0.000  0  #DIV/O!  0.000 
C9  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  #DIV/O!  0.000  0  #DIV/O!  0.000 
E  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  150  150  150  1.000  0.179  0  0.000  0.000 
Comp Rate  3  260  100  9  30  70  90  30  55  190  837  527  0.63  310  0.37 
Justified  2  260  0  0  0  45  70  0  0  150  527 
P(Just)  0.667  1.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.643  0.778  0.000  0.000  0.789  DLRU 
WP(Just)  0.002  0.311  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.054  0.084  0.000  0.000  0.179  0.63 WDLRU 
Unjustified  1  0  100  9  30  25  20  30  55  40  310 
P(Unjust)  0.333  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  0.357  0.222  1.000  1.000  0.211 
WP(Unjust)  0.001  0.000  0.119  0.011  0.036  0.030  0.024  0.036  0.066  0.048  0.37 Icemaker Failure Rate Matrix for MTBUR Calculation 
1.00E-07 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Comp 
Rate 
Comp 
Prob 
C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  E 
Indication 
Rate 
101 
Indication 
Prob 
0.121 0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  10  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  70  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  20  0  0 
246  0.294 1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  80  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  50  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  20  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  25  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  20  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  10  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  40  0 
160  0.191 0  110  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  50  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
70 
108 
0.084 
0.129 
0  70  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  8  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  45  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  15  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  40 
2 
150 
0.002 
0.179 
2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  150 
3 
0.004 
260 
0.311 
100 
0.119 
9 
0.011 
30 
0.036 
70 
0.084 
90 
0.108 
30 
0.036 
55 
0.066 
190 
0.227 
8371 
1.000 
1.000 
Replacement Matrix 
C1  C2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  E 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
6 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0.5 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0.5 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
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VI 
Icemaker Replacement Rate Matrix--ALL REPLACEMENTS 
Rate  Failed  S LRU  WSLRU 
Replaced  Cl  C2  C3  C4  C5  C6  C7  C8  C9  E  Repl Rate  Justified  P(Just)  WP(Just)  Unjust  P(Unj)  WP(Unj)  MTBURuj  MTBUR 
Cl  3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  3  3  1.000  0.002  0  0.000  0.000  #DIY/O!  3,333,333 
C2  1  260  100  0  20  25  20  10  40  0  476  260  0.546  0.176  216  0.454  0.146  46,296  21,008 
C3  1  0  100  0  20  25  20  10  40  0  216  100  0.463  0.068  116  0.537  0.079  86,207  46,296 
C4  0  0  0  9  0  0  0  0  0  0  9  9  1.000  0.006  0  0.000  0.000  #DIY/O!  1,111,111 
C5  1  0  0  1  30  0  10  10  0  0  52  30  0.577  0.020  22  0.423  0.015  454,545  192,308 
C6  1  0  0  8  20  70  20  10  15  40  184  70  0.380  0.047  114  0.620  0.077  87,719  54,348 
C7  1  0  0  1  20  0  90  30  0  0  142  90  0.634  0.061  52  0.366  0.035  192,308  70,423 
C8  1  a  a  1  10  a  a  30  a  a  42  30  0.714  0.020  12  0.286  0.008  833,333  238,095 
C9  1  a  a  8  20  25  20  10  55  a  139  55  0.396  0.037  84  0.604  0.057  119,048  71,942 
E  a  a  a  8  0  a  a  a  15  190  213  190  0.892  0.129  23  0.108  0.016  434,783  46,948 
Camp Rate  10  260  200  36  140  145  180  110  165  230  1476  837  0.57  639  0.43  15,649  6,775 
Justified  3  260  100  9  30  70  90  30  55  190  837 
P(Just)  0.300  1.000  0.500  0.250  0.214  0.483  0.500  0.273  0.333  0.826  DLRU 
WP(Just)  0.002  0.176  0.068  0.006  0.020  0.047  0.061  0.020  0.037  0.129  0.57 WDLRU 
Unjustified  7  0  100  27  110  75  90  80  110  40  639 
P(Unjust)  0.700  0.000  0.500  0.750  0.786  0.517  0.500  0.727  0.667  0.174 
WP(Unjust)  0.005  0.000  0.068  0.Q18  0.075  0.051  0.061  0.054  0.075  0.027  0.43 